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WOMEN'S RIGHTS: REFRAMING THE ISSUES
FOR THE FUTURE*
ARIELA DUBLER, ANIKA RAHMAN, KA THY
RODGERS,JANE SPINAK
Kathy Rodgers:
Good morning and welcome, everyone, to our panel on Women's
Rights: Refraining the Issues for the Future. I am Kathy Rodgers. I'm from
the c lass o f 1 973 o fC olumbia Law School, and I'm l ooking around this
room--this is not what room A and B looked like back then! Everybody has
a microphone, which is great, because we hope to have some good
interactive discussion with all of you this morning.
I am also, in addition to being a Columbia Law alum, the president
of NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund here in New York. For over
thirty-two years, NOW Legal Defense has used the power of the law to
define and defend women's rights. I am particularly pleased to be here
today with Columbia Law School alumnae because Columbia women have
been a substantial part of our team throughout these thirty-two years as
members o f our s taff, a s a cademic p artners, a s student i nterns (including
some young men), as part of our volunteer leadership, as pro bono
attorneys, and as supporters. So with all of these connections, it really is a
matter of personal pride to be back here celebrating the women of Columbia
Law School.
And with all of these brains, from within the Columbia community
and without, working on women's rights, we have made good progress over
the years. It took seventy-two years from the Seneca Falls Convention to
having t he right to v ote i n t he United S tates C onstitution' ( from 1 848 to
1920), but since the 1960s, the latter half of the twentieth century, we have
seen the legal framework for women's rights expand rapidly. Just to tick off
a few things: the Equal Pay Act of 1963 ;2 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 3 which prohibits employment discrimination; Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, 4 which prohibits sex discrimination in
* Panel held at Columbia Law School on October 19, 2002. See Editor's Note,
Introduction to Remarks from the 75th Anniversary of Women at Columbia Law School, 12
Colum. J. Gender & L. 310 (2003).
1 U.S. Const. amend. XIX (ratification completed Aug. 26, 1920).
229 U.S.C. § 206d (1988).
3 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e (1981).
4 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
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education; the Roe v. Wade5 decision in 1973 affirming our constitutional
right to choice; the Pregnancy Discrimination Act; 6 the Freedom of Access
to Clinic Entrances Act;7 a series of Supreme Court decisions affirming that
sexual harassment is sex discrimination on the job and in school; the Family
and Medical Leave Act;' and the Violence Against Women Act of 1994.9
All of these have made a tremendous contribution to the expansion of
women's rights, and certainly the world of our daughters and
granddaughters today offers many, many more choices and opportunities
than I had back in the early '70s, let alone what the pioneers who came to
Columbia Law School seventy-five years ago had.
Nonetheless, despite all this wonderful progress, I feel compelled to
say that progress is not success, and women today are still far from equal in
American society. We are not equal in terms of jobs and economic
opportunity. We are not equal in terms of power in politics and government.
We are not equal, I don't think, in any other major institution that impacts
our lives every day. Think about it: the judiciary, corporations, religions,
the military, the media. I could give you reams and reams of data to
underscore this point. I am going to spare you that, but I have to give you a
few. Just think about the fact that, I think, as of last week there were seven
female CEOs of Fortune 500 companies, which comes out to something like
1.4 percent. 0 At the same time, it is true that ninety percent of the adults on
welfare are women, and most of them are raising children." Today, in the
'410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-(k) (1981).

7 18 U.S.C. § 248(a) (2001).

s Pub. L. No. 103-3 (1993) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2003)).
9 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 16, 18, 20, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). See Sally F. Goldfarb, The Supreme Court. the
Violence Against Women Act, and the Use and Abuse of Federalism, 71 Fordham L. Rev.
57, 147 n.31 (2002):

The Violence Against Women Act was originally enacted as part of the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994). Subsequently, Congress amended,
reauthorized, and expanded some of its provisions in 1996 and 2000.
Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat.
1491 (2000); Pub. L. No. 104-201, 110 Stat. 2655 (1996) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2261A). The 1996 and 2000 amendments did
not affect the civil rights provision. Apart from the civil rights provision,
which was struck down in Morrison, all the other provisions of the 1994
legislation remain in effect, as amended.
'0 Catalyst, 2002 Catalyst Census of Women Corporate Officers and Top Earners
in the Fortune 500 1 (2002).
1 DHHS, Administration for Children and Families Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families Program, Fourth Annual Report to Congress (Apr. 2002).
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trades, where a woman, or anybody, can earn a very good living, women3
12
are 1.7 percent of the carpenters; they are 1.3 percent of the plumbers.'
And that's notwithstanding the fact that it was thirty-seven years ago that
the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, affectionately known
as the OFCCP, set a goal of 6.9 percent for women in the trades in
federally-funded construction projects. 14 So in thirty-seven years we haven't
come close to the minimal-miniscule---6.9% goal!
Closer to home, here in New York twenty years ago, now-Captain
Brenda Berkman sued-used the legal system-to become a firefighter. 5
She, along with thirty-nine other women, became the first women
firefighters in New York City in 1982, and we all celebrated then. We
thought that was real progress, and we looked forward to more growth in
the future. Today there are some twenty-five women in the New York City
Fire Department out of more than 11,000 firefighters.' 6 So we have twentyfive out of more than 11,000 in a city of eight million. Nationwide, it is not
much better: less than three percent of firefighters are women.' 7 Looking at
a bigger picture, we still don't have access to adequate child care and early
education in this country for families, no matter what their economic
standing.
What about government and politics, where the decisions are made?
Well, we are twenty-two percent of the Supreme Court, 18 we are 13.5% of
Congress, 9 and we are zero percent of the United States Presidents.

NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, Nontraditional Occupations For
Women: 1972-2000 (on file with Kathy Rodgers).
12

13

Id.

OFCCP
Compliance
Manual,
Chapter
4,
available
at
http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/ofccp/how2/ofcpch4.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2003)
(goal was originally published in the Federal Register of April 7, 1978, 43 FR 14899, 14900,
as Appendix A. Pursuant to a Notice published in the Federal Register of December 30,
1980, 45 FR 85750, 85751, the 6.9% goal was extended indefinitely).
15 Berkman v. New York, 536 F. Supp. 177 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd Berkman
v.
New York, 705 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1983) (Berkman's original suit challenging entrance
examination; later proceedings regarding retaliatory termination and further examinations).
16 There are twenty-nine women out of a total of 11, 344 total firefighters in New
York according to a study by Public Advocate Mark Green issued May 2001. Jane Latour,
Looking for a Fire Department that Looks like New York, Gotham Gazette.com, at
http://www.gothamgazette.com/iotw/firedepartment/docl.shtml (Dec. 3, 2001).
17In 1999, women were 2.3% of firefighters nationwide. Happy Mother's Day at
http://www.riverdeep.net/current/2000/05/front.120500.mother.jhtm
(last visited June 22,
2003).
14

18There are two women out of nine Justices on the Supreme Court.
19Women comprise seventy-three out of 535 Congress members, or 13.6%. There
are currently fourteen women in the Senate and fifty-nine in the House.
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These facts h ave to make you a sk t he question, "Do our o riginal
frameworks still serve us well in expanding women's rights?" This question
becomes even more critical in light of the current movement which we call
the "new" Federalism, which is a nice, benign rubric covering what is in
fact a radically-conservative legal movement by which our Constitution is
literally being rewritten to strip Congress of its powers to create and
preserve civil rights, and also is limiting access to the courts for redress of
what rights survive. Its leaders include members of the federal judiciary,
Justice Department attorneys, congressmen, and corporate CEOs. I can tell
you that right now, every one of those hard-won statutes that I just listed for
you a minute ago is under challenge in the courts, and conservative legal
theories are having a serious impact. So we do need to construct a new
framework, a framework for the twenty-first century that will serve both to
preserve what we have already won, and help us expand the rights of
women, the rights of minorities, and the rights of all of those groups who do
not have a secure foothold in our society right now. These new frameworks
need to encompass cultural change, they need to encompass substantive law
change, and they also need to encompass procedural law change to move us
to the next frontier.
That is exactly what we are going to explore today. We have three
marvelous panelists who reflect a broad array of experience and approaches
to these questions. They are going to look at women's rights and legal
protections with a general focus on family issues. These are everyday
issues; they are familiar to every one of you in some way or another, no
matter what your legal expertise or personal background. We are looking at
the familiar, and we hope to shake you up a little bit on these issues and see
what you think ought to be done. Our panelists will make some suggestions,
but we really want to leave time for questions and answers from you. The
way we are going to proceed is: I will introduce the panelists and they will
each talk briefly, we'll have a short dialogue among the panelists, and then
open it up to questions and answers with the audience.
First up is going to be Ariela Dubler, who is on my left, an
Associate Professor of Law here at Columbia, although she went to Yale
Law School. Before going to law school, she spent a year in Bangkok,
Thailand. She was already involved in women's rights then, teaching safe
sex to prostitutes--not only teaching it, but teaching it in the Thai language!
After law school, she clerked for Judge Jos6 A. Cabranes of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Her research interests
include feminist legal theory and the history of marriage and its alternatives.
She is going to give us some historical context on refraining women's rights
issues, and then talk about marriage, an institution which is probably both a
little bit more and a little bit less, than what we bargained for.
Anika Rahman will be second. She is a 1990 Columbia Law
graduate, and was awarded a certificate with honors in international and
foreign law by the Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law. She
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reminded me that when she entered the law school in 1987, then-Dean
Black announced that this was the first class coming into the law school that
had roughly equal numbers of women and men, so she was here at an
historic moment.2 ° She worked in international law for a while at Cleary,
Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, and then went to the Center for Reproductive
Law and Policy,2' where she founded the international program and
expanded it to twenty employees. She is an advocate for placing
reproductive rights within the context of international human rights. Our
thesis here today, I think, is that international principles of human rights do
not apply just outside the boundaries of the United States, and that we have
to do something to bring human rights home.
Our third speaker is Jane Spinak, who is also on the Columbia Law
School faculty. She actually started her career as a history teacher in a small
town in Massachusetts. She came to Columbia Law in 1982 and was the
founder of the Child Advocacy Clinic. She also took a few years to serve as
the attorney in charge at the Juvenile Rights Division of the Legal Aid
Society of New York. She has served on numerous task forces and
committees addressing the needs and rights of children and families. She
writes on many topics related to child welfare including the family court
system. I think she may have some suggestions about how we break out of
the box of relying too heavily on procedural reform in the courts to address
some of the critical issues that we face. With that, I am going to turn it over
to Ariela.
Ariela Dubler:
As a relative newcomer to Columbia Law School, it is a real
pleasure to be a part of this event, and so I just want to thank you all for
making this event possible. For those of us here, we very much appreciate
it.
Our task here today-reframing the questions surrounding
women's rights for the future-has rich historical antecedents. As the
historian on the panel, I want to situate our discussion in the context of past
women's efforts t o strategize a bout t he future o f w omen's rights. I think
that the history of women's struggles for legal rights might actually help us
in crafting a contemporary agenda by making visible some of the deeply
entrenched ways that we have come to think about women's legal identities,
ways that we often take for granted because they have become so natural.
Specifically, as Kathy mentioned, I want to tell a story about how the legal
Women comprised forty-five percent of the class entering in the fall of 1987.
Whitney S. Bagnall, A Brief History of Women at Columbia Law School, at
(last
http://www~law.columbia.edu/lawschool/communications/reports/Fal12002?#736
20

visited May 29, 2003).
21 Now the Center for Reproductive Rights. Center for Reproductive Rights, About
Us, at http://www.crlp.org/about.html#name (last visited June 9, 2003).
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rights of women have often been understood within the framework of
marriage, in other words, by locating women as wives within the family. I
want to suggest that our act of refraining women's rights might begin by
stepping outside of that framework to ensure that the meaning of women's
citizenship and women's equality is not necessarily legally mediated
through the institution of marriage.
So, for some quick history, before we look forward to the future, let
me take us back to the nineteenth century. We can plausibly date the
beginning of an organized American women's movement for legal rights to
the first women's rights convention in 1848 in Seneca Falls, New York,
where Elizabeth Cady Stanton read the now-celebrated Declaration of
22
Sentiments. The Declaration's indictment of men's legal treatment of
women notably located its core grievances within the law of marriage and
family relations. In so doing, Stanton and other members of the nineteenth
century women's rights movement attacked the law of coverture, the
common law of husband-wife relations, which prohibited married women
from, for example, entering into contracts, holding property, and many
other things, because a married woman's legal identity was "covered"-that
is the image at the center of coverture-by her husband's legal identity. 23 I
don't have time to go into the various ways in which coverture law changed
and marriage l aw w as modernized throughout the late nineteenth c entury
and into the twentieth century.24 I will just say that, even as the law was
modernized in different ways, married women's legal identities remained
deeply linked with their status as wives.2 5
Of course, as a doctrinal matter, only marriedwomen's legal rights
were defined by marriage law. Into the twentieth century, though, women as
a group were understood in public discussions to be married. So, for
example, in the suffrage context, lawmakers argued that women did not
need the vote because their husbands voted for them.26 Query where single
women fit into this vision. Moreover, when judges and legislators were
22

1848 Seneca Falls, Declaration of Sentiments. reprinted in Joan Hoff, Law,

Gender & Injustice: A Legal History of U.S. Women 383 app. 2 (1991).
23 See Hendrik Hartog, Man and Wife in America: A History 115-22(2000).
24

See, e.g., Michael Grossberg, Governing the Hearth: Law and the Family in

Nineteenth-Century America (1985); Nancy F. Cott, Marriage and Women's Citizenship in
the United States, 1830-1934 103 Am. Hist. Rev. 1440 (1998); Reva B. Siegel, The
Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adiudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, 82 Geo. L.J.
2127 (1994).
25 See, e.g., Norma Basch, In the Eyes of the Law: Women, Marriage, and Property
in Nineteenth-Century New York (1982); Nancy F. Cott, Public Vows: A History of
Marriage and the Nation 156-79 (2000); Siegel, supra note 24.
26 See, e.g., Aileen S. Kraditor, The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement,
1890-1920 24 (1965); Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex
Equality, Federalism, and the Family 115 Harv. L. Rev. 947 (2002).
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forced to confront women living outside of marriage, they often found ways
to define unmarried women's rights in what I call "the shadow of
marriage." By this I mean that single women's rights were regulated by the
normative framework of marriage, even as single women formally inhabited
the legal terrain outside of marriage's borders. So, when confronted with an
unmarried woman's legal claims, the law often judged her legal rights by
putting her into a proximate relationship with marriage. She was on her way
to marriage, or acting married, or formerly married.
Let me give one quick example to make this a little more concrete.
Into the twentieth century, most states recognized the doctrine of common
law marriage,27 which allowed a court to look at a couple that had never
married and essentially say "presto change-o, because you have acted in
certain ways over time, you are now legally married." The ideological
genius of this doctrine was that it transformed non-marital relationshipsrelationships that were potentially subversive from a legal perspective-into
the most traditional of relationships: that is, into marriages. In so doing, it
took single women, a category the law never wanted to acknowledge, and it
transformed them into wives.
Why should we, thinking about the future of women's rights, care
about the history of what I am calling marriage's shadow? I think that the
appeal of locating unmarried women within marriage might actually have
something to teach us today. From the perspective of nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century lawmakers and judges, the appeal of what I am c ailing
marriage's shadow starts to become clear when you consider that almost all
cases that were brought by single women were brought by women who
needed financial support.28 They were seeking money from either a male
partner who had disappeared or from the estate of a male partner who had
died. 29 So, in a time when a woman only had the legal right to support if her
relationship had been in some way marital, 30 by labeling a single woman a
wife, lawmakers could ensure that a particular man would be responsible
for her financial support. In other words, by bringing women within the
framework of marriage, the law shielded the state from having to meet these
women's financial needs, and in so doing it reinforced the idea that all
women's relationships to the state were mediated through the legal

27

Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100

Colum. L. Rev. 957, 996-97 (2000) [hereinafter Wifely Behavior].
28 Ariela R. Dubler, Governing Through Contract: Common Law Marriage in the
Nineteenth Century, 107 Yale L.J. 1885, 1919 (1998); Wifely Behavior, supra note 27, at
964.
29 Wifely Behavior, supra note 27, at 964.
'o Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal
Construction of the Family and the State, 112 Yale L.J. 1641, 1654-58 (2003) [hereinafter In
the Shadow of Marriage].
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institution of marriage, which in turn was based on a family wage model
with a male provider and a female dependent.
A lot has changed since the turn of the last century, and the law in a
whole variety of contexts now recognizes the rights of women living
outside of marriage. 3' That said, I think that history makes visible an
ongoing relationship between marriage's shadow and women's rights. To
give just one example, we need to look no further than contemporary
approaches to so-called welfare reform to see the legacy of what I am
thinking of as marriage's shadow. Recent welfare legislation has embraced
the promotion of healthy marriages as a public goal.32 The reason
underlying this approach deserves full articulation, although it is rarely
articulated this clearly. If marriage were only properly constructed, the
argument runs, it would do an enormous amount of economic work.
Specifically, it would bring the financial needs of women within the family,
thus tethering poor dependent women to particular provider men-that is,
their new husbands-and thereby alleviating the state of its burden of
supporting unmarried women.
I don't want to say that this is all that is going on in contemporary
welfare reform, and there is obviously tremendous class- and racespecificity that differentiates this discussion of marriage and the
relationship to the state from some of the historical discussions that we
could root back to Seneca Falls. I do want to point out that even as there is
obviously a dramatic story of change to be told about women's rights from
Seneca Falls to our anniversary celebration today, this strain in
contemporary public policy-this stress on getting women into marriage as
a form of public policy and a form of government welfare-suggests that
there is also a story of continuity to be told across history, insofar as public
approaches to female poverty continue to envision marriage as a way to
meet women's financial needs, without rethinking the basic relationships
among women, work, poverty, and the state. So, from a historian's
perspective, my hope is that in refraining the issues of women's rights today
we can step outside of marriage's shadow and define women's rights
without imagining marriage a s n ecessarily t he primary Iocus o f w omen's
citizenship or as necessarily a mediating institution between women and the
state.

31 Id.
32

at 1709.

See, e.g., Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act o f 2 002,

H.R. 4737, 107th Cong. §§ 4(4), 103(b)(2)(C) (2002); Linda C. McClain, Care as a Public
Value: Linking Responsibility, Resources, and Republicanism, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1673,
1718-19 (2001); Robin Toner, Welfare Chief is Hoping to Promote Marriage, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 19, 2002, at Al.
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Anika Rahman:
I am going to try and focus my six minutes on trying to reframe
reproductive rights. This is quite a challenge! I am just going to begin by
giving you a very brief sense of what I view as an important background to
the struggles in reproductive rights, both in the United States and globally.
I think that probably it would be a massive understatement to say
that reproductive rights are under enormous siege in the United States right
now. Clearly, the focus of reproductive rights advocacy and the movement
in the United States has been on the issue of abortion. I don't think I need to
tell you that we have a current administration in the White House that is
extremely, extremely hostile to the issue of abortion rights, extremely
hostile to women's equality, and of course a whole host of social justice
issues.3 3 B ut I won't go down that road. In terms o f the Supreme Court,
there has been a substantial diminution in the jurisprudence protecting
abortion rights in the last two decades, 34 and now the Supreme Court hangs
33 This administration's war on women began on President Bush's first business
day in office. On January 22, 2001, President Bush re-imposed a foreign policy restriction
known as the Global Gag Rule (or the "Mexico City Policy"). 66 Fed. Reg. 17303 (Mar. 29,
2001). This policy restricts foreign non-governmental organizations that receive funds from
the United States Agency for International Development's family planning funds from using
their own, non-U.S. funds to provide legal abortion services, lobby their governments for
abortion law reform, or provide accurate medical counseling or medical referrals for
abortion. President Bush took this further anti-woman step even though a 1973 legislative
provision, popularly known as the Helms Amendment, already restricts United States funds
from being used for these activities. President Bush has also sought to undermine the legal
foundations for the landmark abortion rights case, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), by
elevating the status o ft he fetus. N ot only h as the Administration prohibited funding for
research on new embryonic stem cell lines (for recent reference to the Bush Administration's
limit on embryonic cell lines, see Nicholas Wade, Specter Asks Bush to Permit More
Embryonic Cell Lines. N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 2003, at A22), but the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) has also made changes to the State Child Health Insurance
Program (SCHIP) that are detrimental to pregnant women. HHS Press Office, HHS Release
- SCHIP Coverage for Prenatal Care. Sept. 27, 2002, availableat http://www.hhs.gov/news.
HHS has amended SCHIP to extend the plan to cover the "fetus," and the term "child" has
accordingly been expanded to cover an individual below the age of nineteen and in the
"period of time from conception to birth up to the age of 19." Department of Health and
Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 42 C.F.R. Part 457, Federal
Register, Vol. 67, No. 191 (Oct. 2, 2002). Soon after HHS issued this regulation, the Bush
Administration withdrew its support for bipartisan legislation that added pregnant women to
SCHIP on the basis that such legislation was no longer needed now that coverage was being
provided directly to the fetus. International Women's Health Coalition, Factsheet: Bush's
Other War: The Assault on Women's Reproductive and Sexual Health and Rights 2 (2003).
The conservative records of the Bush Administration's federal judicial candidates provides
additional evidence of this administration's hostility to progressive social justice causes.
34 In the years since Roe v. Wade there have been gradual cutbacks in the scope of
protection for a woman's right to choose an abortion. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992) (reducing level of judicial scrutiny on laws that restrict abortion to the
"undue burden" standard, eliminating Roe's trimester framework, and permitting states to
enact regulations that limit women's ability to seek abortions so long as such regulations do
not present a "substantial obstacle" to a woman seeking an abortion); Rust v. Sullivan, 500
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in the balance on abortion rights. I don't need to tell you that the last
decision rendered by this Court was a 5-4 decision 5 Abortion rights
remains one of the most contentious social and political issues in this
country. Given that reality, I am sure it will come as no surprise to all of
you that the key legal issues in this arena in the United States have
obviously been laws attempting to limit abortion rights. This onslaught of
laws has been directed both at what I would call the provider, or "supply,"
side, and what I would call the woman's side, or "demand," including
issues such as mandatory delay and biased information requirements. 36 Of

course, domestically t here a re a n umber o f n on-abortion r elated issues a t
play. 37 These include restrictions on pregnant women, abstinence-only until
U.S. 173 (1990) (upholding HHS regulations which prohibited Title X projects from
engaging in abortion counseling, referral, and activities advocating abortion as a method of
family planning); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (holding
that a statutory ban on the use of public employees and facilities for the performance or
assistance of non-therapeutic abortions did not contravene the Constitution); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (finding denial of Medicaid funding did not "interfere" with
women's rights to make reproductive decisions and the state could promote fetal life through
pregnancy by discriminatory funding); Belotti v. Baird 428 U.S. 132 (1979) (upholding state
law that required either parental consent or court order for minors seeking access to abortion
services).
" Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (finding that a state law banning
"partial birth abortion" violates the Constitution because it lacks any exception for
preservation of health of the mother and because it imposes an undue burden on a woman's
ability to choose a more common abortion procedure, thereby unduly burdening the right to
choose abortion itself).
36 Numerous state laws aim to limit or restrict the ability of medical professionals
to provide abortion services. For example, laws known as Targeted Regulation of Abortion
Providers (TRAP) attempt to regulate the medical practice or facilities of doctors who
provide abortion by imposing burdensome requirements and stringent regulations. Sixteen
states and Puerto Rico have TRAP laws. Center for Reproductive Rights, TRAP: Avoiding
the TRAP 1 (2003). However, twenty-five states have enforceable TRAP laws. NARAL ProChoice America, Who Decides? A State-by-State Review of Abortion and Reproductive
Rights 2003 220 (2003) [hereinafter "Who Decides?"]. In addition, forty-five jurisdictions
have a "physician-only law" that makes abortion a crime unless a licensed physician
performs it. Center for Reproductive Rights, Laws and Regulations Affecting Medical
Abortion (2001). Laws seek to impose extra burdens on women seeking abortion services by
imposing mandatory waiting periods and biased counseling requirements. Such laws were
particularly popular in 2002, when states considered a total of sixty-six waiting period and
biased counseling measures. Who Decides?, supra at viii. A total of seventeen states have
mandatory waiting periods for abortions. Id. at 211. Moreover, thirty-two states enforce laws
requiring the involvement of an adult, typically a parent, before a minor may obtain an
abortion. Id. at 216.
37 Examples and discussions of the range of domestic reproductive rights issues
can be seen on the websites of major reproductive rights organizations. See, e-g., NARAL
Pro-Choice America, at http://www.naral.org; Center for Reproductive Rights, at
http://www.reproductiverights.org; The Alan Guttmacher Institute, at http://www.agiusa.org; National Family Planning & Reproductive Health Association, at
http://www.nfprha.org; Planned Parenthood Federation of America, at http://www.ppfa.org.
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marriage programs-I think that goes back to some of what Ariela was
talking about-and emergency contraception. But there is simply no doubt
that the focus of reproductive rights has been on abortion rights in the
United States.
Turning now to the global scene, we have a very different set of
facts and situations. For the last three decades, the international community
has been thinking more in terms of population stabilization, and about its
linkage to economic development and the environment.38 The discussion
regarding what we would call reproductive health concerns has generally
not been in terms of women's rights or reproductive rights. In fact, it was
only in 1994 that the international community recognized the term
"reproductive rights" and defined it very broadly to include what we would
call reproductive self-determination as well as access to reproductive health
care. 39 Nonetheless, internationally, abortion remains a highly contested
issue even in discussions of reproductive rights.40 Equally, an important
political challenge in the global arena has been to move institutions and
governments to think about issues in terms of rights, particularly in terms of
women's rights and empowerment. Despite the growth of a strong
international women's and women's health movement, the tendency of
many mainstream institutions has been to think in terms of population
dynamics and economic development.4'
38

See Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and

Development, Cairo, Egypt, 5-13 September, 1994, in Report of the International
Conference on Population and Development, U.N. Doc.A/CONF. I 71/13/Rev. I (1995); Rio
Declaration, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil, 3-19 June 1992, in Earth Summit: Agenda 21: The United Nations Programme of
Action from Rio, U.N. Doc. DP/1I344, (1994); Ruth Dixon-Mueller, Population Policy &
Women's Rights: Transforming Reproductive Choice (1993) (especially chapter 2, at 32-53,
and chapter 3, pp. 55-78); Lynn P. Freedman & Stephen L. Isaacs, Human Rights and
Reproductive Choice, 24 Stud. Faro. Plan. 18, 21-23 (1993).
39 The term is first used in paragraph 7.3 of the Programme of Action of the
International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, Egypt, 5-13 September,
1994, in Report of the International Conference on Population and Development, U.N.
Doc.A/CONF. 171/13/Rev. 1 (1995).
40 Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, Promoting Reproductive Rights: A
Global Mandate 22 (1997). One of the most recent examples of how abortion remains
politically contested occurred in 2002 at the Fifth Asian and Pacific Population Conference.
There, the Bush Administration sought to block re-affirmation of the 1994 Programme of
Action of the International Conference on Population and Development. The United States
objected to the use of the terms "reproductive health services" and "reproductive rights" and
stated that the United States "supports the sanctity of life from conception to natural death."
Vijay Joshi, U.S. Stance on Abortion and Condom Use Reiected at Population Conference,
Associated Press, Dec. 17, 2002; International Women's Health Coalition, Factsheet: Bush's
Other War 2, available at http://www.iwhc.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page&pagelD=468
(last updated May 19, 2003).
41 Gita Sen, Development, Population and the Environment: A Search for
Balance,
in Population Policies Reconsidered: Health, Empowerment and Rights 63 (Gita Sen et al.
eds., 1994); United Nations, Report of the International Conference on Population, 1984,
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My own background and understanding of reproductive rights in
two very different scenarios has shaped my thinking about how to reframe
reproductive rights for the future. What I like about the global perspective
about reproductive rights is its breadth. The international view of the term
includes both reproductive self-determination and the right of access to
health care. This breadth reflects the needs of women all over the
world-women of different classes, races, and socio-economic
backgrounds. However, the problem with the global definition is that it has
really stemmed from a concern, as I said, with population dynamics and
with controlling population, or perhaps increasing it in some countries. The
global perspective has not been based clearly within the framework of
women's rights. When you look at the domestic context, one of its greatest
strengths, from my perspective, is that reproductive fights and abortion
rights are seen clearly as women's issues.4' There is no question really
about this socio-political reality, and, to some extent, it is a testament to the
great strength of the women's movement in this country. However, I think
one fundamental weakness of the domestic scene has been its excessive
concern with the issue of abortion. This concern for abortion may have been
a response to the fact that the Right Wing in the United States has focused
its attention on abortion and has come up with numerous assaults on this
one issue. But, when you sit back and you look at women's lives, the reality
is that abortion, sex education, sexuality counseling, education about
HIV/AIDS, protection from all sexually transmissible infections, and
infertility are all equally important. They are all critical components of
reproductive health care. There is an important linkage between abortion
and all of those issues, not just conceptually, but also from the perspective
of the needs of women and their lives, whether they be adolescents or older
women. 43 Therefore, I would propose redefining reproductive rights as a
women's issue, but moving beyond a civil liberties framework.
I propose thinking of reproductive rights in two fundamentally
different ways. First, the term reproductive rights should be understood to
E/Conf.76/19 (1984); United Nations, Report of the United Nations World Population
Conference, A/Conf.60/19 (1974).
42 Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Abortion and Woman's Choice: The State,
Sexuality, and Reproductive Freedom (Northeastern Univ. Press 1990) (1984); Janet
Benshoof, The Truth About Women's Rights, 6 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 423,424

(2000); Lisa Pruitt, A Survey of Feminist Jurisprudence, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 183,

191 (1994); Elizabeth Warren, What is a Women's Issue? Bankruptcy, Commercial Law and
Other Gender-Neutral Topics, 25 Harv. Women's L.J. 19, 23 (2002).
43 The terms "reproductive health" and "reproductive health care"
are defined in
paragraph 7.2 of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and
Development, Cairo, Egypt, 5-13 September 1994, supra note 39. In addition, paragraph 7.6
of this document specifically sets forth the different components of reproductive health care
and includes most of the issues set forth in the text. Id. at 7.6.
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cover the full range of reproductive decision-making, particularly the
decision about if and when to have a child, as well as whether or not to have
a child. This conception of reproductive rights includes not only the right to
decide when to become pregnant and to terminate a pregnancy, but also the
right to carry a healthy child to term. It is crucial to maintain the neutrality
of reproductive rights to include the ability to have and to not have a child.
The second element of my proposed redefinition would be to ensure that
reproductive rights addresses the full range of reproductive health concerns
that women and men actually face. As I said, this starts with sexuality
education and includes contraception, sexually transmissible infections
(including HIV/AIDS), and issues of sexual violence. So I would propose a
redefinition of reproductive rights to refer to the constellation of rights that
enable individuals, particularly women, to control their bodies and to go
through childbearing safely.
What follows from this redefinition of reproductive rights is that
such a right has two fundamental components. The first is the right to
reproductive health care. I think the promise of reproductive selfdetermination rings hollow if you cannot access services. What does it
mean to have the right to abortion or HIV counseling if you don't have the
services that enable you to exercise that right? I propose that reproductive
health care be defined to include family planning, abortion, safe
motherhood, HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmissible infections,
infertility, and issues relating to gender violence and sexuality. An equally
fundamental component of reproductive rights is the right to reproductive
self-determination. This is a term that I think many people are familiar with,
and that can be used to encapsulate the principle that individuals must
control their reproductive and sexual life. It translates into a right to plan
one's family, the right to freedom from interference in reproductive
decision-making, and t he right t o b e free from a 11 forms o f violence a nd
coercion.
I have a lot more to say on this subject, but I am told that I need to
wrap up, so I will wrap up and I look forward to questions.
Jane Spinak:
Yesterday, Commissioner Robinson spoke about international
women's rights,44 and what I was struck with was her concern that women's
voices are not being heard. This morning, I went to the panel that the
scholars had and it was fascinating to hear how each of them was concerned
with women's voices not being heard, which is certainly a theme that has
gone on in legal feminism for a long time. Katherine Franke mentioned that
she was particularly worried that legal feminists don't look at the intrapsychic issues that women present. Carol Sanger talked about work she is
"Mary
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doing that makes her worry about law as humiliation for women,
particularly girls in abortion bypass proceedings. Regina Austin talked
about women's voices being stereotyped. And so, I am going to try to put a
very concrete face on this concern when I talk this morning about women
and dignity in family court, and how I don't believe that unless we change
the way in which women's voices are heard in family court, and other
litigants' voices are heard in family court, we will not succeed in reforming
family court.
I teach a class in which students represent children in family court
proceedings, a clinical course. One thing I do about a third of the way into
the semester is invite mothers who have had children in foster care, and
who now serve as parents' advocates, to come and talk to the class about
their experiences. This is at a point where the students have been introduced
to family court, but have not really had an interaction with the litigants.
They are shocked to hear what these women have to say. They begin, of
course, by talking about how they frequently are not given counsel, or, if
they have counsel, they don't have much access to that counsel. The law
students can understand that because they have begun to work with lawyers
in family court and realize that there are not sufficient numbers of lawyers
there. The mothers also talk about the delays and their waits, and the
students also understand that because they have begun to see that
themselves. But it is what the mothers next say that I think has the most
impact. The mothers say that they are invisible in these proceedings, that no
one respects them, that they have no dignity in the courtroom, that everyone
speaks around them but not to them, and that generally they are not spoken
to except to be yelled at for having failed to do something or to be told that
they have done something wrong. This is a shock for the students, because
they themselves feel, as they are beginning their careers, that they don't
have much of a place there. But they don't realize the extent to which the
clients feel that way.
Who are these clients? Who are these mothers and children? Family
court is a poor people's court, disproportionately poor people of color and
poor women and children.45 Just this last month, the Journal of the
American Medical Society issued a study of injuries to children under three
at a Philadelphia hospital between 1994 and 2000.46 Minority children of at
least a year old were three times as likely to be reported for suspected child
47
abuse than white children, and they also have more x-rays done as a result.
So, the danger is both the over-reporting of rminority children and the underSarah H. Ramsey, The United States Child Protective System-A Triangle of
Tensions, 13 Child. & Fam. L.Q. 25, 27 (2001).
46 Wendy G. Lane et al., Racial Differences in the Evaluation of Pediatric
45

Fractures for Physical Abuse, 288 JAMA 1603-09 (2002) (studying children with particular
kinds of fractures).
47 id.
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reporting of white children. While this study is consistent with earlier
reports about the disproportionality of minorities in the child welfare
system, it is important to remember that most of the cases that the judges
deal with are about neglect and not abuse.48 Poverty and its consequences
continue to be the single greatest predictor of whether a child will enter the
foster care system and be subject to family court jurisdiction. 49

Family court has been in existence for about 100 years,50 and,
unfortunately, for about that period of time, there has actually been a
constant effort at reform. 51 But that reform will continue to fail without the
recognition of two things. One is the constitutional rights of parents, and, of
equal importance, their human dignity. Reformers have predominantly
focused on procedural changes to achieve efficiency.52 They have tried to
address this under-resourced institution, which is plagued by high volume,
delay, and congestion, mostly through procedural or administrative
remedies. What we know from looking at the history of family court
generally and of general court reform is that these procedural changes have
rarely made a difference in changing the way in which the court works. 53 So
that leaves most of us feeling very stuck in terms of how we think about
reform.
We might think about two interlocking approaches to reform that
have the potential for success. One is requiring a strict adherence to the
constitutional mandates of family integrity, and the second is to structure
the court differently so that judges have sufficient information to be able to
48
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Health and Human Services, Highlights of Findings of 1999 National Child
at
System,
Reporting
Neglect
and
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(Apr. 25, 2001).

49 Martin Guggenheim, The Foster Care Dilemma and What to Do About It: Is the

Problem that Too Many Children Are Entering Foster Care?, 2 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 141, 145
(1999).
50 The first Juvenile Court was established in Illinois in 1899. See Douglas E.
Abrams & Sarah H. Ramsey, Children and the Law: Doctrine, Policy and Practice 1038
(2000).
"' Alfred J. Kahn, A Court for Children: A Study of the New York City Children's
Court (1953); Barbara A. Babb, Fashioning an Interdisciplinary Framework for Court
Reform in Family Law: A Blueprint to Construct a Unified Family Court, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev.
469 (1998).
52 Edward P. Mulvey, Family Courts: The Issue of Reasonable Goals, 6 Law &
Hum. Behav. 49, 52 (1982); Jane M. Spinak, Adding Value to Families: The Potential of
Model Family Courts, 2002 Wis. L. Rev. 331, 364. See, for example, New York State's most
recent Family Court reform proposals. Judith S. Kaye & Jonathon Lippman, N.Y. Unified
Court System, Family Justice Program Initiative 1 (1997), 11 (1998), and 111 (2001).
53 Mulvey, supra note 52; see also Harry N. Scheiber, Innovation, Resistance, and
Change: A History of Judicial Reform and The California Courts, 1960-1990, 66 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 2049, 2052 (1993) ("[T]he evidence suggests that the reforms have seldom been truly
successful.").
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determine when a family can remain together or be reunified. Family courts
have routinely been reluctant to ensure the constitutional rights of parents
separated from their children, for some obvious reasons.54 One is they are
worried a bout t he nature of t he charges themselves. S econd, t hey h ave a
sense that the child welfare system will not protect these children. Third, the
judges a re a fraid o f b eing b lamed for s ending c hildren home and h aving
them h armed. Fourth, they don't feel that they have enough information.
And five, they don't know what the outcomes of their decisions will be
when they do keep children together with their families.
There is a current system of trying to reform family court called the
model court system, which relies on a number of key elements that I think
can help achieve systemic reform.55 Most importantly in the context of
human dignity is that model courts have given parents a voice in the court
proceeding. There is a greater reliance on court conferencing s6 There is a
greater reliance on listening to what the parents have to say in order to
determine what should happen for this family. But there are two other
essential elements: the court is given much greater information by all the
players in the system, and the case is brought back to court far more
frequently. So, if the judge makes a decision that allows children to remain
with parents or is trying to decide whether a c hild can remain w ith their
parents, he or she quickly hears what the result of that decision is because
there is a continuous monitoring of the cases.
This model has begun in a number of places around the country,
including here in New York.57 In its initial stages, it has had some amazing
consequences, 58 the first being that children are going into foster care less
and are staying for much shorter periods of time. 59 But, what may be more
important, and which ties back to what I began with, is that the parents who
are involved in these model courts feel as if they are respected, as if they

Peggy Cooper Davis & Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for Children at Risk:
Bias. Sequentialitv, and the Law, 2 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 139 (1995).
5 Spinak, supra note 52, at 332. Model courts share some common features: an
activist judge who helps to fashion, and then closely monitor, dispositions; a "team" of
lawyers, social workers, and court personnel who try to identify and then work toward
common goals with the family; and frequent and meaningful court appearances by relevant
parties.
56 For a detailed description of court conferencing, see Sara P. Schechter, Family

Court Case Conferencing and Post-Dispositional Tracking: Tools for Achieving Justice for
Parents in the Child Welfare System, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 427, 431 (2001).
57 Spinak, supra note 52, at 361, 368.
58 Schechter, supra note 56, at 428, 430.
59 Id. See also Robert Victor Wolf, Fixing Families: The Story of the Manhattan
Family Treatment Court, J. Center for Fams., Child. & Cts., at 19 (2000).
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have dignity, as if what they say matters. 60 Even when the court decides that
their children cannot live with them, they know the reasons. They
understand because the court explains things in a way that is rarely seen in
the general family court system. This combination of acting differently
procedurally in the court, but also giving women their voices in that court,
seems to be having a real effect.
Kathy Rodgers:
I thank you all for being, in fact, brief. The problem is that each one
of the p anelists c ould take up the whole hour and a q uarter-so this has
been a real challenge. But let me start a dialogue among the panelists on
what we would call practical questions. We need theoretical frameworks,
but we also need to know how things work in the real world.
In my organization, we have been working for a long time on the
issue of the promotion of marriage in welfare reform. It is touted as a
means out of poverty for women, but we see it as being about forcing poor
women to get married and controlling their choices about their lives. The
argument we confront all the time is reflected in this quote from Robert
Rector of the Heritage Foundation, which is a foundation that provides a lot
of advice and counsel to the current administration and conservative policy
makers. He said,
Marriage is a very, very successful road out of poverty for
women. From what I see in the research, the best thing a young
woman can do is to graduate from high school, get married and
have children. Then if her marriage runs into trouble, she can use
welfare programs-to save i t,
one o f t hese p rograms-meaning
61
to save the marriage.

Ariela, help me out here. We want to get women out of poverty. What is the
answer to this thinking?
Ariela Dubler:
Legal historians love being asked practical questions! Having given
you six minutes of what I think, it will surprise you not at all to discover
that the Heritage Foundation and I are not always on the same page with
respect to marriage. I don't know if I have the answer, but I can try to offer
60 These observations are based on conversations with parents, judges, and lawyers
working in some of the model courts. See also Spinak, supra note 52, at 366, n. 181; Special
Child Welfare A dvisory Panel, Advisory Report On Front Line And Supervisory Practice
48-49 (2000), available at http://www.aecf.org/child/pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2003). There
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61 See, e.g., Betty Holcomb, Conservatives Push for Marriage Promotion
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another way t o think a bout i t. I think t hat w hen t he press reports o n t he
current Bush administration's approach to welfare, they report it as
something very new: a new way to look at things, the novel approach. Part
of what I am trying to make clear today is that this is far from new; this is in
fact deeply intertwined about ways we have thought about marriage and
poor women since the founding. I would not try to argue that women should
not have the choice to marry, obviously, nor that there is anything
inherently wrong about women making the choice to marry. What I am
trying to find a new way to think about, particularly in response to the kind
of approaches the Heritage Foundation is offering-which has become a
very prominent approach in politics today-is the view of what might be
lost if we only think of poor women's options in that way. There is an
element of coercion-what, I think, Kathy is getting at-such that, given
the legal incentives that are set up, perhaps poor women do not have the
ability to make choices about their private, intimate lives in the way that
wealthier women do. There is also a question about the relationship
between women citizens and the state that this view of marriage necessarily,
if very quietly, embodies: a relationship of the citizen, of women's
citizenship, that inserts marriage as a boundary, as a necessary part of
women's public legal identities.
To historicize this again, there is an 1872, now very well known,
decision called Bradwell v. State62 which had to do with whether a woman
had a right to be admitted to the bar to practice as a lawyer. The most wellknown part of this decision is a concurring opinion by Justice Bradley who
said that women have no right to be lawyers because women are mothers,
and they are married, and this is in contradiction with being a lawyer. The
point that I think is relevant here is the language he uses-that this is not a
right of women because of the "constitution of the family. ' , 63 There is an
interesting kind of linguistic slip here between what kind of constitutional
rights a woman has in the public order and the so-called constitution of the
family. He is very explicit that single women, although they might exist on
the margins, are an exception to the rules of the constitution of the family.
So, we have a lengthy history of the ways in which the constitution of the
family intersects with women's rights under the Constitution of our country.
I certainly don't have a clear answer to how we should solve all of these
problems. I wish any of us did. But I think one important tool to have in
thinking through these problems is that kind of perspective.
62

Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872).

63 Id. at 141. Justice Bradley says: "The constitution of the family organization,
which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of

womanhood." Id.
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Anika Rahman:
Well, I was just wondering, Ariela, what do you think about
viewing this focus on marriage as attempting to privatize responsibilitytaking responsibility away from the state and saying, "You go get married
and your marriage will take care of you"? To what extent does this view
play into the notions of a limited role of government in people's lives and
the privatization of responsibility as opposed to taking it into the public
domain? What would you think about that?
Ariela Dubler:
I think that is absolutely right, and again I think that is something
we have seen since the founding-the idea that if men take care of women,
the state doesn't have to take care of women. I think that is explicitly what
is going on in marriage promotion and that is often what underlies the
attempt to situate women as wives as opposed to independent actors.
Kathy Rodgers:
Let's pick up that point and let me ask you a question, Anika. We
are a country that has stressed individual rights, we value individual effort
and we expect the state to have a limited role. In the era of the 60s and the
70s, in the twentieth century, we looked to the state or the government to
help the poor, prevent discrimination, and provide more social services.
You are talking about international rights and the reframing of rights. What
do you think the practical effects would be of your way of refraining, in this
case, the context of reproductive rights? Is it moving it out of the private
sphere to the public sphere, or is it something different?
Anika Rahman:
I think it is. In terms of the role of the state, I see that there is a
fundamental need to redefine that role. I am not just thinking of the state not
interfering in reproductive decision-making, but I am talking of a state
which actually is neutral on the issue of reproductive choice, of the
individual's choice. In other words, the state should support the choice the
individual makes, whether to terminate a pregnancy or to carry it to term.
And, there should be no financial incentives either way, so you don't fund
pregnancy services and de-fund abortion services. That would be one quick
answer to your question.
The other thing that I am talking about is a fundamental redefinition
of the role of the state. If you think about reproductive health care as a
fundamental aspect of reproductive rights, the state has a responsibility to
provide such services. That is, we are not talking about privatizing medical
services. We are talking about thinking of health as a right, a view that is
not currently supported politically or legally in this country. I am not sure
there are too many countries that are at that point, by the way. I think that
probably Western Europe, particularly Scandinavian countries, and Canada
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64
are much more progressive o n t heir p olitical perspectives o n t his i ssue.
But I don't think the United States is isolated on this one. I do think that if
you think of reproductive fights as including services, we are talking about
a very different view of what the state should be doing, and, of course, we
are talking of spending a lot more money on health. The moment you think
of health as a right, the role of the state is a fundamentally different one and
it has to provide these services to everybody, particularly, as we know, to
lower income women and communities of color. It's a big challenge.

Kathy Rodgers:
I see some hands going up. Do you mind, Jane, if we go straight to
the questions because I am sure you will get some?
Audience Member One:
Anika, I agree 100% with your vision, as you know, from our many
late nights discussing such issues, while roommates in law school, instead
of studying! I think about some of the statistics and political issues that we
are facing as a country now, and it is a little hard not to get discouraged
about the ability to achieve your vision. I am thinking specifically of the
statistics that I read fairly recently that the states in this country that have
the most restrictive abortion laws also have the lowest level of social
services for mothers. For example, you think about the debate in
Washington now, over the extension of the child health insurance program
to fetuses, where you have essentially the effort to promote healthy
motherhood, healthy childhood consigned to the political ight and the
women's rights advocates on the other side. In trying to think about some of
Ariela's comments, I don't think t hat healthy childhood c onsigned t o t he
political right has always been historically true and, correct me if I am
wrong, but I seem to remember that there might have been a mother's
insurance movement in the 1920s or 30s that was promoting a similar
vision, but from a feminist point of view. It just struck me that perhaps the
shadow of marriage has fallen over not just the social policies directed at
women over time, but over the goals of the women's rights movement
itself, in kind of an invisible way; the answer to getting out of marital
oppression, if you will, was just so oppositional to the kinds of initiatives
that Anika was talking about-in other words, the way of being
autonomous through having your own career and not being economically
dependent. I a m c ertainly a proponent o f t hat. I guess m y point i s t hat I
agree with your vision. It seems very, very difficult, for the reasons that all
of you have addressed, to actually achieve it; and right now, it seems to be,
64 See, e.g., Jason B. Saunders, Note: International Health Care: Will the United
States Ever Adopt Health Care For All?: A Comparison Between Proposed United States
Approaches to Health Care and the Single-Source Financing Systems Of Denmark and the
Netherlands, 18 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 711 (1995).
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in t his country, that that part of the debate belongs to the side that is in
opposition to women's rights advocates.
Anika Rahman:
Anybody have a comment on this?
Audience Member Two:
I just wanted to applaud the panel as well for the many
perspectives, but Anika raised a question about a country that actually has
thought about these questions differently. I have just come back from South
Africa, w here in fact these q uestions a re incorporated i n a m uch b roader
constitutional framework, including one sort of economic right, the right to
health. We just saw the Constitutional Court force the government to
provide Nevirapine to pregnant HIV-positive women. 65 I guess the question
really is how to move out of this very narrow constitutional framework,
within which you find yourself an individual civil liberties context, and that
is a very difficult question to answer.
What I see in South Africa-and I certainly don't want to use South
Africa as a model because there are severe problems with respect to
women's rights and so on-but, what has happened is something that I
think women have fought for in this country about connections between
other social movements. You really do begin to see, I think, a change. It is a
continuous problem. I was in the public interest panel this morning and I
think that part of the way of dealing with this is trying to connect women's
rights to other questions. You can't talk about women's rights without
talking about poverty, for example. The way to possibly overcome some of
these perennial problems is to continue the question about not just
contextualizing women's rights, but working with other organizations who
confront the myriad of problems that poor people confront and who also
happen to be disproportionately women.
Anika Rahman:
I did want to respond, to some extent, to what I think of as my
portion of both of those comments. I think it is true that the vision that we
are talking about is very difficult, particularly in the current political climate
in the United States. There is no doubt about that. I think that it has to be,
however, a long-term vision that one has, and there are short-term battles to
be fought. I also think on the specific issue-when you were talking about
the insurance SCHIP 66 program-the reproductive rights movement has
65

Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (1) 2002 (10) BCLR 1033

(CC) (mandating that the government must permit and facilitate access and use of drug that
reduces risk of HIV transmission from mother to child).
66 State Children's Health Insurance Program under Title XXI of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1397aa (1997).
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allowed the Religious Right to talk about them as being the defenders of
pregnant women's rights and, to some extent, of seeing women have
children. 67 I think that is highly problematic politically. We need to regain
that ground, not because the Religious Right has taken it over, but because
it is a r eality of o ur lives. I think we have to have a reproductive rights
movement that says vocally, "Yes, of course, we support pregnant women's
rights also." In this case, you are taking a back door step, undermining
reproductive rights, while purporting to be interested in the rights of women
having children. I think that is a fair point. B ut, w e shouldn't h ave even
gotten to that point. I think if you propose a framework broadly, and say
that we are also interested in those issues such as that of the maternal
mortality rate among African Americans in this country, which is at least
triple that of White women,68 you have to ask the question: "Why?" And,
thinking of this more broadly also brings new political constituencies to the
table l ike c ommunities of c olor that have traditionally been marginalized
from the mainstream reproductive rights movement for a whole host of
reasons. 69 To bring them to the table, to bring a more progressive voice, and
to reflect the concerns about women, I think one needs to broaden the
framework. We shouldn't be on the defensive about SCHIPs. You need to
say it's a backdoor way, but we need to have been more up front in saying
that we were concerned also about women's ability to carry children to
term.
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America, at http://www.cwfa.org; the Family Research Council, at http://www.frc.org; the
Eagle Forum, at http://www.eagleforum.org; and Focus on the Family, at
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68 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health
Statistics, National Vital Statistics System, Vital Statistics of the United States, vol 1.
natality and vol 2, mortality, part A, for data years 1950-1993. Public Health Service,
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, for 1994-2000 (unpublished data), available
at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/tables/2002/02hus044.pdf (African American maternal
mortality rate is at least triple that of non-Hispanic white women).
69 Darci Burrell, The Norplant Solution: Norplant and the Control of AfricanAmerican Motherhood, 5 UCLA Women's L.J. 401, 406 (1995); June Inuzuka, Women of
Color at the Center: Selections from the Third National Conference on Women of Color and
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Audience Member Three:
In response to your question, Kathy, on the Heritage Foundation,
the question that I would raise is: what happens to women when the
marriage falls apart? Particularly, we know that the people who tend to
suffer in divorce, often economically, are women. And it has nothing to do
with simply being a woman; it is because the wife becomes dependent on
the husband financially, has not developed a career, and there is no way to
divide the money to give the woman, and oftentimes the children, the same
standard of living that they had during the marriage. Then, of course, there
is the additional problem of the husband providing the support that he is
ordered to provide. Given that, and given the fact that there is a fifty
percent divorce rate, it really shows that marriage is hardly the answer to
economic security for women.
Another issue that came to my mind, Jane, in terms of family court.
As a judge not in family court, it seems to me that groups that are
concerned, particularly in New York, about judges not always being
responsive to allowing children to remain with parents when it is an
appropriate approach to take, could be to b e supportive when j udges are
attacked in the press for doing that very same thing and then are accused if
something terrible happens to the child. I know that some of the bar
associations have started to make this effort. I have seen it more on the
criminal side, but it would be something to think about as a way of
encouraging judges perhaps to think a little differently.
Jane Spinak:
It is a really important issue, because in family court the media has
had a huge impact on judges making decisions. 70 They have significantly
shied away, if they believe there is any question of safety, from allowing
children to remain at home. I think part of the reason is, as I said, in most
cases there is such little monitoring and so little reporting back to the court
about what is going on that the judges feel they have no control if they do it.
On the other hand, the media has been relentless in going after judges when
something has happened to a child at home.7' Actually, a study was done
about judges making decisions, essentially risk decisions, and found that
they often made the wrong decision because they were afraid of deciding to
allow a child to remain home.72 So, part of it is shifting the system so that
the system provides sufficient information such that a judge can feel
comfortable making that kind of decision. But your suggestion is very
helpful. There was a recent family court judge who faced a lot of objection
to her being reappointed. It wasn't talked about very much in terms of one
70
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71 Spinak, supra note 52, at 349, n.76.
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of t he reasons w hy s he w as being c hallenged, but t hose o f u s who work
within that system know that it was because she was willing to take
seriously children staying at home with their parents, if they could stay
home safely. There was a lot of objection to her being reappointed.
Ariela Dubler:
I would like to add one comment on the first part of your comment
about whether marriages can be the solution when we all know that
marriages end all of the time, so it is a short term solution at best, if it is a
solution at all. One of the interesting things about the ways that public
policy tries to bring women within marriage, is that it is in extending
marriage's reach that legislators and courts really try to define what
marriage means. There are all too few opportunities for lawmakers to
actually say, "This is what marriage means." One of the sites at which I
think that happens is precisely in the area that I am thinking of as
marriage's shadow. And so, I think that the very denial of the fact that such
a high number of marriages end in divorce is precisely one of the points of
legislating in this way. This is actually the opportunity to publicly redefine
marriage as, again, life-long, in kind of an active denial of the social reality
that we all know, that, statistically, marriages are not life-long. So I actually
think that that perverse, deliberate ignorance is one of the appeals of this
way of thinking about marriage.
Audience Member Four:
Kathy, can you just speak a little bit about federalism? I think that
one of the mistakes that we made about human rights issues is the
reproductive rights isolation. I think one of the things you talked about
before was that federalism is a very cohesive movement having a broad
structure of interest that many diverse civil and women's rights groups may
not understand that they are plagued by a common enemy.
Kathy Rodgers:
Well I think youj ust said it pretty well. The question is what is
happening with this federalism movement, and most people, I believe, think
of it as a state's rights issue. The "sovereignty" of the states, the "dignity"
of the states, are favorite words in the courts. They don't talk of it in terms
of its impact on civil rights or on women's rights. It's true that this
federalism movement is dealing in a whole array of subject areas, but the
legal principles they are developing are then used to attack civil rights. So,
for example, we have federal civil rights statutes such as the Americans74
With Disability Act 73 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
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both of which the Supreme Court has said do not apply to state employers.75
While framed as a state's rights, state's dignity issue, it takes millions of
people out from coverage of those acts. They are now challenging things
like the Equal Pay Act 7 6 and family care leave under the Family and
Medical Leave Act, 77 specifically women's rights issues. 78 The issues of

access to the courts are coming up in contexts like patent law or others
totally unrelated to civil rights, 79 but there is a very clear pattern of seeing
that these same theories are next going to be applied to civil rights cases.
So, we can't just wait until the right women's rights case comes down the
pipe to try to preserve the law. We have to be watching all of those cases.
Getting out of a silo mentality is very important in our own domestic law
situation and it is directly relevant to what Anika is saying, which is that we
have to get out of our silos when we are talking about movements or
domestic rights and international rights; we have to be able to think much
more broadly, both to preserve what we've already got and to expand
beyond what we've got.
Audience Member Five:
In discussing this whole issue about the support of women-I guess

I am addressing Ariela-it seems that you were focusing a lot on women,
but the real bottom line agenda is having to support children. The men and
women without children who get divorced have to support themselves, and
they can manage, but it is the children that really have to be supported by
somebody. This focus on marriage in the welfare context is really because
we don't see the health and welfare of children as a communal
responsibility. It seems to me that universal health care and universal child
care for children would change this debate enormously. The notion that
society has to have children, has to have children be born, has to have them
be educated because twenty years from now, those children are going to be
answering our inquiries when we call the phone company and we call the
computer company and we go to the supermarket and all these things. I
know there is a huge conflict about resources between people that have
children and people who don't have children, and conflict about the notion
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Florida
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
76 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1998) (Equal Pay Act of 1963).
75
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argued Jan. 15, 2003).
79
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that having children is a private choice and welfare mothers shouldn't have
children because they don't have the money, such as, "I am a rich woman
and I waited to have my children until I had enough money." But I just feel
like it would change the debate a lot if people saw and recognized that
society has to have children, and those children are going to be born, and
they are going to grow up, and they are going to be badly educated, and
badly nourished, and badly schooled. They are going to run society if they
are w ell educated a nd healthy and have good u pbringings, e t cetera. The
notion of de-privatizing support of children would change this whole notion
about marriage and welfare. I say this as a person who grew up not wanting
to have children. My mother was very anti-marriage and anti-children, but I
have been married for twenty-seven years and I have three children, so I am
in a very different spot than I expected to be. But after having gone through
a complete change in my view of myself, I see children as being a
communal good, not just a private good-sounds like a funny thing to say,
but something along those lines.
Audience Member Six:
Well, that just leads amazingly well into what I was going to say,
because I have been just really reacting to the comment about the
importance of connecting women's rights to other contexts and getting out
of our silos. I graduated in 1992, but the last year I have spent out of law
producing a television show called "Keeping Kids Healthy" (which, by the
way, runs on channel thirteen at 2:30 on Friday afternoon). I thought I was
coming here completely separate from that, but, especially listening to Jane,
I heard two things that struck me so deeply in terms of the
interconnectedness of all the issues. One was just, not surprisingly, the
general discussions about the supposedly negative consequences of single
parenting. Our show is for adults. It is about how to keep your kids healthy
and we get into psycho-social issues. We have been discussing the issue of
whether we should be doing a segment on single parenting, but I have been
keeping it at arm's length until I had a chance to really, really get a sense of
what the pros and cons are because of the obvious marriage-related
questions about it. The other thing that struck me was when you started
talking about women's voices not being heard. We had a show about body
image and self-esteem that we produced last week. We had everybody from
a little kid who started eating paper at five years old because she thought it
was a really good way to keep from becoming fat, to a group of pre-teens in
middle school who were discussing, "Gee, I don't think that's an important
word," but while they all mouthed the right things you wanted them to say,
they all had pictures on their walls of these incredibly skinny models. One
of the points that the advisor made is that this whole concept of girls having
to be very small shrinks not only their bodies, but she said it shrinks their
selves, and it shrinks their voices. They feel that they are required to take up
a very small space physically and psychologically and that their voice
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doesn't have the right to be heard. It just struck me in what you are saying,
how body image and having to be thin contributes in some way to the
failure of women's voices to be heard. It's just something else we have to
pay attention to.
Audience Member Seven:
Thank you. Going back to this historical context, in considering the
Heritage Foundation premise that marriage will do it all, Elizabeth Cady
Stanton and her womenfolk didn't come up with the idea of "We should
have rights" in an abstract way. The origin of their movement was the
abandonment of wives by their dissolute, drunk husbands. That is why they
needed to protect their property. When you think about it, they figured it out
then that women needed rights apart from their spouses. You know it i s
hard to believe that we are going back that far.
Kathy Rodgers:
It is hard to believe. I've got time for one more back there.
Audience Member Eight:
I was so struck by that quote from the Heritage Foundation, having
attended several conferences and meetings about the disparate impact of the
changes of social security on the lives of elderly women as opposed to
elderly men, another i ssue we don't have time to explore today. But the
greatest single predictor of poverty in old age is having children. If we stop
to think about that, I am wondering if it wouldn't help Anika think out of
the box, because that bill is coming due as the population ages. There is a
whole cohort of people who are coming into their aged years. Do we want
them to be totally dependent on society for their sustenance, or ought there
be a way in which having children does not directly lead into a povertystricken old age? I am wondering if that might be another way of looking at
this issue of child care and supporting women who might not be married,
but have had children.
Kathy Rodgers:
There are a lot of ways of looking at that. I am going to take the last
word, if nobody minds, on this whole issue of children and childcare and
what happens to women: poverty. Why? Because women move in and out
of the workplace, but most of the benefits that they get are tied to work.
Social security pension is either tied to your job or, if you were married,
your husband's job.80 General pension benefits stem from work. Health
care relies on your relationship to work. And yet, there is this view that
women shouldn't work; we should be home in the family, taking care of the
'o 42 U.S.c.S. §§ 402 et seq. (1935). For an explanation of the Social Security
Act, see http://www.ssa.gov.
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children. This is something that many, many of us don't live in real life, but
it is a dominating theory. To me, it seems that getting to the issue of valuing
the care of children and providing benefits for that could come in the form
of direct money to women who stay home for some period of time-and we
can argue endlessly whether that's six weeks, six months, or six years
(whether you are employed or not). It could be by according pension
benefits for time you spend taking care of children, which is something that
society needs. It can also go to having a child care system which provides
the whole array of diverse services that people want for children of different
ages, for women in different situations, and for families, allowing them to
choose what it is that they want to do. I can invite you to join our national
child care and early education campaign; we'll be launching in early 2003.81
It really is an issue of not thinking so much about limited, specific
legal rights in the context of the legal system that we have now, a
complaint-based system where somebody has to do something bad to you
before you can go to court to get it rectified. It means we redefine the rights
that people should be entitled to and the nature of the claims they can make
through the legal system.
I am going to end by saying that clearly we have a lot of work to
do. I want to thank the panelists who were just wonderful. I want to thank
the audience who were equally wonderful in your comments. I hope this has
provoked you to think about these issues in some new ways, and to think
about some new ideas. I really want you to act on them. It does matter who
is on the bench. It does matter who is in Congress and who is in the
legislature. It does matter that you support your law school and create a
whole new generation of lawyers. It does matter that you support
organizations like the Center for Reproductive Rights, Children's Rights
Organization, or other organizations. It does matter what you do, so go out
and act on your beliefs. Thank you very much.

81 For more information about the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund

campaign, see Family Initiative: Better Child Care, Preschool and Afterschool, at
www.familyinitiative.org (last visited May 29, 2003).

